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Hockstad: Conditional Innocence

Conditional Innocence and the Myth of
Consent: The Subtle Coercion of CERCLA’s
Contiguous Property Owner Protection
Trayce Hockstad*

INTRODUCTION
The roots of environmental regulation of private property for the benefit
of the public began, for the Western world, more than 400 years ago in the form
of personal litigation. 1 It was the lone plaintiff who, through particular use of
the nuisance suit, began to expand the scope of available legal remedies for
ecological grievances – sometimes in defiance of procedural formalities of the
English feudal court system. 2 For centuries, common law courts remained the
chief legal avenue for resolving environmental disputes between private parties. 3 American courts eventually labeled these suits as either nuisance 4 or
trespass actions. 5 With the exception of a rare quarrel over interstate pollution, 6 the burden of pursuing environmental regulation was largely left to the
individual disgruntled plaintiff and the extent of his annoyance with his neighbor.
At the close of the nineteenth century, however, political and social policies began to influence the course of environmental litigation. Judicial opinions began to engage in equitable balancing between environmental and economic concerns, with a heavy bias in favor of promoting a profitable national
* Special thanks to Regional Counsel at Environmental Protection Agency, Region III
and Office of General Counsel for including me on a challenging, rewarding exploration of this issue in my final year as a law student.
1. See Cantrel v. Church (1601) 78 Eng. Rep. 1072 (establishing that a nuisance
action for interference with a right of way could be brought and successfully argued
“by a stranger, who hath nothing to do with the Land”).
2. See Aldred’s Case (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (Lord Coke). William Aldred
brought suit to prevent the spread of “corrupted air” emanating from a neighbor’s piggery. Id. Although this type of suit was generally brought by a “novel disseisin” action,
which provided a successful plaintiff with the remedy of a return to the status quo,
Aldred successfully brought “an action on the case” so that he might be awarded damages. DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 245 (2004).
3. Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental
Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 161.
4. See, e.g., Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268 (1890) (“[N]o
place can be convenient for the carrying on of a business which is a nuisance, and which
causes substantial injury to the property of another.”).
5. See, e.g., Keppel v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 200 Pa. 649 (1901).
6. See New Jersey v. City of New York, 284 U.S. 585 (1931); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
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market. 7 Instead of following the traditional rule of granting injunctions for
established nuisance activities, 8 courts weighed the plaintiffs’ property interests against the social utility of the defendant’s action. 9 This new method of
analysis for common law nuisance actions, combined with the public health
crises of the Industrial Revolution, released a wave of federal regulatory legislation across the United States. 10 The first decade of the twentieth century saw
the introduction of laws aimed as equally at regulating trade as guarding public
health, such as the Lacey Act of 1900, 11 the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 12
and the Insecticide Act of 1910. 13 But after World War II, Congress began to
target private industries solely on the basis of environmental concerns, specifically for pollution control. 14 A fear that the world had become a nuclear test
zone filled with untold amounts of seeping radioactive waste fanned the flame
of federal regulatory legislation. 15
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the modern notion of environmental
regulation began to take shape. New statutes like the National Environmental

7. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in America
Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1159, 1177–84 (1986) (describing the development of the “balancing of conveniences” doctrine in Pennsylvania
courts). Bone criticizes the application of the doctrine as follows: “Damages could not
adequately compensate for a residential plaintiff’s injury since the value of plaintiff’s
property right could not be measured in monetary terms. Denying injunctive relief in
residential plaintiff cases in effect reduced the value of the nonfungible residential use
to a fungible quantity.” Id. at 1178.
8. Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV.
485, 493 (2010) (noting that abatement was “ordinarily required” after establishing a
nuisance “regardless of how profitable or important the nuisance-making activity
was”).
9. See, e.g., Richard’s Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 107, 114 (1868) (holding that injunction was not appropriate to prevent an iron smelter from discharging soot over a plaintiff’s land because the iron works represented a $500,000 investment and employed
more than 1,000 men).
10. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1986) (crediting the rise of administrative law in the 1960s and
70s and increasing federal regulation to a “response to unanticipated economic crises,
emerging risks to public health and safety, and shifting public sentiments towards disadvantaged classes”); see also the White Phosphorous Matches Act, Pub. L. No. 62–
118, 37 Stat. 81 (1912) (taxing the use of white phosphorous in match manufacturing
to prevent disease outbreak).
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–78 (2018).
12. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
13. Pub. L. No. 61-152, 36 Stat. 331 (1910).
14. See Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
15. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1157 (1995).
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Policy Act, 16 Endangered Species Act, 17 Clean Air 18 and Clean Water 19
Amendments, Toxic Substances Control Act, 20 and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (“RCRA”) 21 established clear precautionary measures for protection of natural resources and public health. But these acts did little to address the thousands of sites, scattered across the United States, already filled
with chemical byproducts from years of experimental technological testing. In
response to a growing national concern after events like the Love Canal disaster, 22 Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) in 1980. 23
Since its adoption, CERCLA has been the subject of substantial, ongoing
litigation. The original legislative purpose of CERCLA was to empower the
government to apportion liability among parties responsible for the thousands
of abandoned landfills that threatened public health and safety. 24 Perhaps the
most controversial aspect of CERCLA is its imposition of strict liability on a
wide range of individuals who previously owned or currently own polluted
land. 25 The broad sweep of this liability has been tempered, in some respects,
by subsequent additions of affirmative defenses. While the statute imposes
strict liability on those who have caused or may have caused the release of
hazardous waste into the environment, it also correctly exempts otherwise innocent contiguous landowners whose property has become contaminated by
migrating pollution. 26 This exemption is conditioned, however, on the property owner’s guarantee of “full cooperation, assistance, and access” to persons
conducting response actions on site for the duration of the operation. 27 Refusal

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976). RCRA sets out a framework for
proper management of solid waste, both hazardous and non-hazardous. Id.
22. In 1978, a canal, which had been converted by the Hooker Chemical Company
to a landfill for hazardous waste, exploded after the area received a record amount of
rainfall. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA J. (Jan. 1979), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/love-canal-tragedy.html. Hazardous waste leaked into the
groundwater causing chemical burns, birth defects, and widespread environmental destruction. Id.
23. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
ch. 103 (2018)); see also 42 U.S.C. ch. 103 [hereinafter CERCLA].
24. H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 1 (1985).
25. Christopher D. Man, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Settling Potentially Responsible Parties in the Allocation of CERCLA Liability, 27 ENVTL. L. 375, 376 (1997)
(“[CERCLA] is widely criticized as unfair because it imposes retroactive, strict, and
joint and several liability upon a broad class of persons whom Congress has deemed
‘responsible’ for hazardous waste contamination.”).
26. CERCLA § 9607(q)(1)(A).
27. Id. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(iv).
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to grant access to government agents necessarily results in the loss of the affirmative defense and the possibility of CERCLA liability for any cleanup costs
or damages from the hazardous waste. 28
This Article examines the relationship between the conditional status of
innocence CERCLA offers under the contiguous property owner provision and
the Fifth Amendment right of landowners to receive just compensation for governmental taking of private property. It specifically argues that, under current
law, innocent landowners pay a high price for release from CERCLA liability.
Access to property of contiguous landowners is generally obtained through the
consent of the owner. But while consenting to government access for response
actions preserves the shield to CERCLA liability, it also often prevents the
landowner from successfully bringing a suit for just compensation if the use
and enjoyment of his or her land are destroyed by the government’s continued
access. 29 In other words, a property owner whose land is contaminated through
no personal fault (and potentially through the fault of the government itself)
may be forced to choose between liability for the hazardous waste under
CERCLA and the loss of the right to exclusive control of the land, even if the
owner is not compensated for the government’s occupation of the property.
Consequently, CERCLA’s contiguous property owner defense requires innocent landowners to surrender their constitutional rights to bring Fifth Amendment compensation claims against the United States. The conditions of this
affirmative defense create a subtle coercion that may technically survive judicial scrutiny but contradicts the public policies of both waivers of constitutional
rights and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 30
The easiest solution to this problem is to amend CERCLA’s requirements
for the contiguous property owner defense to exclude the grant of full, perpetual access to contaminated property. It is unlikely that many landowners will
refuse to cooperate with the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA’s”) remedial procedures, even without compensation, but removing the coercive
conditions of the statute would allow the statutory defense to serve its intended
purpose of protecting innocent property holders without compelling them to
surrender ownership rights. Owners would be free to entertain other options
for remedial action, negotiate access agreements with the government, and –
perhaps most importantly – accurately assess the cost of unrestricted government access as cleanup efforts perpetuate. 31
28. See id.
29. See infra Section III.A.
30. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine restricts the government’s ability to

condition the receipt of benefits generally held out to the public or qualifying individuals on surrender or compromise of a constitutional right. Such situations are prone to
amount to government coercion. See B&G Enters. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 523,
527 (1999).
31. The diminution in the value of private property by loss of the right to exclude
the government has been recognized by the federal government many times. See, e.g.,
Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“In the bundle of rights
we call property, one of the most valued is the right to sole and exclusive possession –
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I. CERCLA’S COERCIVE REPUTATION: THE HUNT FOR PRPS
A. From CERCLA to Superfund
Almost as soon as CERCLA was adopted, legislators realized they had
underestimated the problem posed by hazardous waste sites across the nation.
The initial scope of the statute was a five-year, $1.6 billion program to address
“orphan” dump sites – which, by EPA estimates in 1980, affected one in six
groundwater systems serving less than ten thousand persons and one of every
three larger systems. 32 By 1985, however, some estimates put the number of
abandoned hazardous waste sites in the United States as high as 20,000. 33 The
House Committee on Energy and Commerce described the issue as follows:
[In 1980,] most believed that cleaning up a site was relatively inexpensive and involved removing containers or scraping a few inches of soil
off the ground . . . .
Today, five years later, our understanding of the problem posed by
abandoned hazardous chemicals is entirely different. The [EPA] Office
of Technology Assessment now estimates there may be as many as
10,000 Superfund sites across the Nation, or an average of 23 sites per
Congressional district . . . . We now understand that a cleanup frequently goes far beyond simple removal of barrels. It often involves
years of pumping contaminated water from aquifers. 34

In light of the discovery of the magnitude of hazardous waste sites and
the expense of remedial action, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”) of 1986. 35 SARA extended certain
CERCLA initiatives and authorized extra funding over the next eight years. 36
Furthermore, SARA established the right of potentially responsible parties
(“PRP”s) to seek contribution from other PRPs, thus opening the door for third
party interpleading. 37 Just as the scope and term of CERCLA’s applicability
expanded to match the unanticipated gravity of the nation’s pollution situation,
so too the nature of CERCLA liability began to expand.
CERCLA was a departure from the traditional model of twentieth-century
federal regulatory legislation in at least one crucial way: it was not truly regulatory. Instead of establishing a supervisory program, Congress created a
the right to exclude strangers, or for that matter friends, but especially the Government.”
(alteration in original)); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The essence
of all property is the right to exclude . . . .”).
32. S. REP. NO. 99-11, at 2 (1985).
33. Id.
34. H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 1, at 54–55 (1985).
35. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
36. Id. at 1645.
37. Id. at 1647–48.
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framework for imposing strict liability for past and present hazardous substance releases. 38 The ultimate goal of CERCLA was to promote expedient
and efficient remediation of polluted sites. 39 Accordingly, the statute provided
EPA with a range of options to motivate response efforts. For instance, EPA
may issue an administrative order to direct a responsible party to abate the danger of a hazardous substance release, 40 obtain injunctive relief to order the
abatement, or undertake the abatement itself using Superfund resources and
then sue the responsible party for reimbursement. 41 The federal government is
also permitted to delegate cleanup decisions to the states or to impose state
standards for remedial procedures when “applicable” or “relevant and appropriate.” 42 But federal to state delegation rarely happened in the early years of
CERCLA enforcement, 43 perhaps because of the all-encompassing nature of
the statute’s liability scheme.
There are four categories of PRPs contemplated under CERCLA: (1) current owners and operators of sites responsible for the release of hazardous
waste; (2) former owners or operators of the sites at the time waste disposal
occurred; (3) any person who arranged for the disposal of the waste; and (4)
any person who accepted the hazardous waste for transport. 44 Essentially, any
party who participated in the process of creating or disposing of hazardous
waste is on the hook for the cost of cleanup, whatever that may be. 45 Furthermore, current owner liability exists regardless of whether the owner had anything to do with the original pollution; a person who purchases property contaminated sixty years ago is still potentially liable today for that hazardous
waste. 46
Liability for hazardous waste pollution under CERCLA is not only strict
but also, in some cases, joint and several. Unless the harm is divisible, liability
for cost recovery actions brought under § 107(a) is joint and several, 47 while

38. Percival, supra note 15, at 1163.
39. Jasmine M. Starr, Note, Making Good Neighbors: Liability for Passive Migra-

tion of Hazardous Waste Under CERCLA, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 435, 439 (2004).
40. CERCLA § 9606 (2018).
41. Id. § 9607.
42. Id. § 9621(d).
43. Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1534–35 (1995).
44. CERCLA § 9607(a).
45. See Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the
Controversy over CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 90–92 (1997) (noting two types of actions for enforcing
liability on PRPs: (1) cost recovery claims of a non-PRP cleanup agent against a PRP
under § 107(a) of CERCLA and (2) contribution claims of one PRP against another
under § 113(f)). Some courts have further delineated the allocation of liability in various claims of PRPs brought against other PRPs. See id. at 106–13.
46. See Starr, supra note 39, at 440.
47. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171–72 (4th Cir. 1988).
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liability for contribution actions brought under § 113(f) is several only. 48 In
1983, the United States sought reimbursement from twenty-four defendants for
the costs of remedial action at the disposal site of the Chem-Dyne treatment
facility. 49 The defendants, who were collectively involved in different stages
of the generation and transport of hazardous waste, argued that they should not
be held jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs. 50 The court held, instead,
that the deletion of references to joint and several liability in the final version
of Superfund was not intended to reject joint and several liability but “to have
the scope of liability determined under common law principles, where a court
. . . will assess the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an individual basis.” 51
In 1986, CERCLA was held to be retroactive in its imposition of liability. 52 In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Co., the government
brought an action, under RCRA, against a pharmaceutical company for illegally disposing of drums containing hazardous waste. 53 The disposal took
place in 1979 and the government’s action was originally commenced in August of 1980. 54 However, in August of 1982, the government amended its
complaint to allege retroactive liability under CERCLA, which had been enacted after the commencement of the suit. 55 Despite the defendant’s contention
that its conduct was neither negligent nor unlawful at the time it occurred in
1979, and the fact that nothing in the statute expressly provided for retroactivity, the court found that CERCLA liability applied to pre-enactment conduct. 56
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, CERCLA’s reputation was solidified
as a coercive imposition of inescapable liability on an enormous pool of PRPs.
In 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that suits for
recovery of costs of removal and remedial actions were regarded as actions for
restitution and, consequently, no right to jury trial attached to these proceedings. 57 District courts subsequently split as to whether a right to jury trial existed for contribution claims under CERCLA § 113(f). 58 The only appellate
court that addressed the issue held that a § 113(f) claim was essentially equitable and no right to jury trial attached. 59

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Hernandez, supra note 45, at 84.
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
Id. at 804.
Id. at 808.
United States v. Ne. Pharm. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id. at 732–33.
Id. at 729.
Compare Am. Cyanamid Co. v. King Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 209, 213–15
(D.R.I. 1993) (finding no right to jury trial), with United States v. Shaner, No. 85–1372,
1992 WL 154618 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1992) (finding a right to jury trial).
59. Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. Conn., 59 F.3d 400, 414 (3d Cir. 1995).
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B. Conditional Innocence Under the Small Business Liability Relief
and Brownfields Revitalization Act
At the end of the twentieth century, environmental legal scholars increased their outcry against CERCLA for unfairly penalizing anyone who
owned or had ever owned land contaminated by hazardous waste disposal
sites. 60 The result was that many of these sites, known as “brownfields,” were
largely neglected by the private developers who could most afford to purchase
and rehabilitate them. 61 In 2002, Congress addressed the rising concern that
the far reach of CERCLA’s liability scheme had set back the original legislative
purpose of cleaning up and restoring hazardous waste sites across the United
States by enacting the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (“Small Business Liability Protection Act”). 62 The Small Business Liability Protection Act instituted a variety of exemptions to Superfund
accountability. 63
Although SARA had established an innocent purchaser defense, the defense did not promote investment in brownfields because it only applied to
owners who had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the polluted nature of the property at the time of purchase. 64 The Small Business Liability

60. See Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1129 (N.D.
Fla. 1995) (“While it may seem inequitable, the mere migration of contaminants from
adjacent land constitutes disposal for the purposes of CERCLA, and passive downstream landowners are liable for the cleanup costs resulting from their neighbors’ activities.”); Colin Crawford, Medical Monitoring and the Future of CERCLA: Reinvigorating the Superfund Law’s Consequentialist Purpose, 28 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 839, 840
(1996) (“People with different political philosophies and divergent views on the appropriate role of environmental protection nonetheless often agree that various CERCLA
provisions, and in particular its imposition of joint and several liability, are an unjust
practice.”); Melody A. Hamel, Comment, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in Comprehensive General Liability Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in Favor of Coverage
in 1996 and Beyond, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1083, 1122 (1996) (“The strict liability scheme
of CERCLA is often criticized as flawed and unfair.”).
61. David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs As Laboratories of Democracy?,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 86, 92 n.19 (2005) (noting that voluntary brownfields programs
existed “in the shadow of – and substantially because of the threat of – coercive regulation such as CERCLA”); Larry Schnapf, Sweeping CERCLA Amendments Will Affect
Brownfields, Prospective Purchasers, 33 ENVTL. REP. 264, 266 (2002) (“The CERCLA
definition of a ‘facility’ includes any area where hazardous substances have come to be
located. As a result, property owners have been concerned that they could be held liable
for contamination that has migrated onto their property . . . . This potential liability has
discouraged development of brownfield sites.”).
62. Pub. L. No. 107–118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) [hereinafter Small Business Liability Protection Act].
63. See id.
64. See Starr, supra note 39, at 442–43.
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Protection Act created new defenses for brownfield redevelopers and contiguous property owners 65 to “provide incentives for investors to purchase and redevelop . . . usually vacant or mothballed parcels of industrial or commercial
property in economically depressed downtown urban areas that sit idle out of
fear by potential investors that the property is possibly contaminated.” 66 Section 221 of the Small Business Liability Protection Act amended § 107 of
CERCLA by exempting landowners whose property is contiguous to and contaminated by a release of a hazardous substance from the property of another
from PRP status. 67
The contiguous property owner defense, however, requires that the contiguous landowner (1) not have caused the contamination; (2) not be affiliated
with the contaminating party in any type of agency capacity; (3) exercise due
diligence at the time of purchase and be unaware of contamination; and (4) take
reasonable steps to stop any continuing release and prevent future release. 68
Nestled in the middle of these expected and unremarkable qualifications, however, is a requirement that the landowner cooperate with the response actions
ordered by the government. Section 107(q)(1)(A)(iv) conditions the availability of the defense on whether
the person provides full cooperation, assistance, and access to persons
that are authorized to conduct response actions or natural resource restoration at the vessel or facility from which there has been a release or
threatened release (including the cooperation and access necessary for
the installation, integrity, operation, and maintenance of any complete
or partial response action or natural resource restoration at the vessel or
facility). 69

Shortly after CERCLA was amended to include the contiguous property
owner defense, commentators speculated that the new language actually expanded the liability of adjacent landowners. 70 Instead of relying on what appeared to be the common interpretation of the statute – that an otherwise innocent landowner could not be held accountable for his neighbor’s pollution – the
Small Business Liability Protection Act planted a legal minefield through
which a landowner must successfully navigate (or, alternatively, fail) to qualify
for the affirmative defense. Whereas a PRP attempting to install monitoring
wells on a neighbor’s contaminated contiguous property had previously been
65. See Small Business Liability Protection Act § 221.
66. AMCAL Multi-Hous., Inc. v. Pac. Clay Prods., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1028

(C.D. Cal. 2006).
67. CERCLA § 107(q)(1)(A).
68. Id. § 107(q)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), (v)–(viii). Compliance with information requests
and reporting requirements is also a condition of the defense. Id.
69. Id. § 107(q)(1)(A)(iv).
70. See Schnapf, supra note 61, at 267 (“It has been a rare instance when a property owner whose property has been impacted by a plume migrating from an off-site
source has been held liable under CERCLA.”).
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required to pay for such access as part of its good faith requirements under an
administrative or consent order, the amended language placed the burden on
contiguous landowners to exercise “appropriate care” in preserving their defenses – a phrase many believed coerced a grant of access. 71 This necessary
grant of access to the contiguous landowner’s property to avoid liability for
hazardous waste pollution immediately aroused Fifth Amendment concerns. 72
These concerns are justified based on the applicable law and policy of cases at
the intersection of Fifth Amendment takings and environmental regulatory jurisprudence.

II. A BRAND NEW GAME: ACCESSING AN INNOCENT OWNER’S LAND
A. Carefully Constructed Consent
Sections 104(b) and (e) of CERCLA are designed to enable EPA easy
access to a PRP’s property for purposes of both gathering information required
to assess response actions and carrying out such actions. 73 PRPs are required
to provide EPA with requested information and to permit EPA to enter contaminated sites, inspect them, and to take samples of soil, water, and other
things. 74 In the event a PRP denies required access, EPA may either issue an
administrative order to prohibit interference with entry or go to court to obtain
compliance with its request for entry. 75 Should the court determine that noncompliance with a request for access has been “unreasonable,” it may assess a
civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each day that access was denied to the government. 76 In short, CERCLA compels access to the contaminated properties
of PRPs to conduct response and remedial actions and to prevent the release of
hazardous waste.
Contiguous property owners who do not fall under PRP status, and whose
land does not contain the source (or “plume”) of contamination, cannot challenge a remediation order in federal court once access to land is granted and a
71. Id.
72. See id.
Presumably, a contiguous owner will have to allow access to PRPs to conduct
response actions in order to be deemed to have exercised “appropriate care” and
no longer be able to demand compensation as a condition for access to the property. It is quite possible that a court may conclude that a contiguous property
owner who denies access to PRPs to conduct response actions or refuses to allow institutional controls to be placed on property because of inadequate compensation may have not exercised “appropriate care” and be liable under
CERCLA.

Id.

73.
74.
75.
76.

See CERCLA § 9604(b), (e) (2018).
Id. § 9604(e).
Id. § 9604(e)(5).
Id. § 9604(e)(5)(B)(ii).
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remedial plan of action is issued. 77 Historically, courts have held that § 104(e)
authorizes entry on adjacent properties in order to reach a contaminated site
and to carry out an approved response activity. 78 However, if the purpose of
the access is to determine whether remedial action is warranted at all, and no
emergency circumstance allows for response agents to enter, 79 the authority of
EPA to access property hinges on the consent of the landowner. 80
CERCLA requires EPA to request the consent of landowners before pursuing other options to access property. 81 Although EPA retains the more timeconsuming option of issuing a unilateral demand for access if it is reasonable
to believe that the contiguous property poses a threat of rerelease of the hazardous substance into the environment, 82 the reasonableness of such demands
may then be challenged in court. 83 EPA guidance documents specifically explain the importance of consent as follows:
Consent is the preferred means of gaining access for all activities because it is consistent with EPA policy of seeking voluntary cooperation
from responsible parties and the public . . . .
...
If practicable under the circumstances, consent to entry should be memorialized in writing . . . . Although oral consents are routinely approved by the courts, a signed consent form protects [EPA] by serving
as a permanent record of a transaction which may be raised as a defense
or in a claim for damages many years later. If a site-owner is unwilling
to sign a consent form but nonetheless orally agrees to allow access,
77. United States v. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2001).
78. United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1273 (D.

Mass. 1988).
79. See CERCLA § 9606(a); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89, 95–
96 (D. Conn. 1988) (discussing the “imminent and substantial endangerment” standard).
80. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d at 601 (“[D]istinguishing between cases in which the
agency either is rightfully on the land to perform remedial measures or does not have
to be on the land because the order is directed to the landowner . . . and cases in which
the agency must get access to the land to execute remediation.”). The court denied the
request based on “very limited evidence of an environmental hazard that . . . [EPA] has
put forward to justify its request for an access order,” because if the “ground for going
on the property is to undertake remedial measures, the court cannot perform its duty of
determining whether the agency’s proposed action is arbitrary or capricious without
considering whether the measures proposed are a reasonable basis for authorizing what
would otherwise be a trespass.” Id. at 601–02.
81. Reeves Bros. v. EPA, 956 F. Supp. 665, 673 (W.D. Va. 1995) (citing CERCLA
§ 9604(e)(5)(A)).
82. See CERCLA § 9604(e)(3)(C).
83. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d at 601 (“[W]hen an access order is sought, judicial jurisdiction clicks in; the arbitrary and capricious standard clicks in”).
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EPA should document this oral consent by a follow-up letter confirming
the consent. 84

For the vast majority of cases involving preliminary investigations of
properties, EPA relies on simple, one-page consent forms signed by landowners. 85 These documents include both general grants of property access to EPA
personnel for the purpose of taking samples and drilling boreholes for soil and
groundwater collection, as well as catch-all provisions for “other inquiry actions at the property as may be necessary to determine nature, extent and potential threat to human health and the environment.” 86 EPA guidance documents reject attempts to negotiate the terminology and conditions of entry because of the risk of imposing compensation obligations on EPA. 87 If consent
is denied, EPA personnel are instructed to “explain EPA’s statutory access authority, the grounds upon which this authority may be exercised, and that the
authority may be enforced in court.” 88
In the event that EPA agents are successful in persuading a landowner to
sign a consent form (a high likelihood if the discussion includes the loss of the
contiguous property owner defense and potential imposition of liability for
thousands of dollars in cleanup costs or fees for denial of access), the form will
reflect that the owner “g[a]ve this written permission voluntarily with the full
knowledge of [his or her] right to refuse and without threats or promises of any
kind.” 89 Two parts of this statement are likely to be untrue for contiguous
property owners. First, while a property owner may have had “full knowledge”
of the right to not sign the form, it is much less likely that he or she knowingly
signed away the ability to bring a successful claim for compensation against

84. Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Admin’r EPA, to RPA
Regional Admin’rs 4, 6 (June 5, 1987), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/cont-access-mem.pdf) [hereinafter OSWER Directive].
85. See
e.g.,
EPA,
CONSENT
FOR
ACCESS
TO
PROPERTY,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/tba-access-form.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
86. Id.
87. OSWER Directive, supra note 84, at 7.
Persons on whose property EPA wishes to enter often attempt to place conditions upon entry. EPA personnel should not agree to conditions which restrict
or impede the manner or extent of an inspection or response action, impose
indemnity or compensatory obligations on EPA, or operate as a release of liability. The imposition of conditions of this nature on entry should be treated as
denial of consent and a warrant or order should be obtained.

Id.

88. Id. at 6.
89. CONSENT FOR ACCESS TO PROPERTY, supra note 85.
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the government for any damage to, or prolonged use of, the property. 90 Second, if the property owner did sign the consent form with such knowledge, it
is highly unlikely that the permission was truly given voluntarily. 91

B. Why Waiver Won’t Work
The policy behind waiver of constitutional rights is essential to understanding whether an innocent landowner has been coerced into granting access
that destroys his or her right to bring a compensation claim against the government. For several reasons, EPA’s consent to access forms signed by property
owners cannot be construed as waivers of a right to later sue the government
for, specifically, the right to demand just compensation from the government
if private property is taken for public use. 92
Although parties may validly contract to waive due process rights in both
civil and criminal contexts, an agreement to surrender a fundamental right is
never presumed. 93 In both civil and criminal matters, courts must indulge
“every reasonable presumption against waiver” of a constitutional right. 94 Accordingly, courts must be able to positively determine the presence of language
surrendering a known right 95 and should avoid finding an implicit waiver of
any constitutional privilege. 96
In Cienega Gardens v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit addressed whether a waiver of a takings claim was implicit in
a use agreement entered into between the government and private parties pursuant to a housing project. 97 The government argued that the private parties
waived their right to bring a takings claim by acknowledging the receipt of
valuable and sufficient consideration as part of an alleged release agreement. 98
90. See Roger D. Schwenke, Regulatory Access to Contaminated Sites: Some New
Twists to an Old Tale, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 749, 750 (2002)
(“Many landowners also probably believe that when an agency demanding access goes
too far, they are protected by their right to assert a claim of there being a ‘taking’ of
their property. However . . . that right and opportunity is very limited.”).
91. Id. at 750 n.4 (“[T]here is very little real voluntary ‘consent’ associated with
many such documents received by EPA.”).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
93. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972).
94. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
95. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (finding no waiver when “the contractual language relied upon does not, on its face, even amount to a waiver”).
“[W]aiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear.” Id.
(emphasis added).
96. Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2007) (“In any event, waiver of
a constitutional right must be clear and unmistakable.”); Ricker v. United States, 417
F. Supp. 133, 139–40 (D. Me. 1976) (“To be effective, waiver of a constitutional right
must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made.”).
97. 503 F.3d 1266, 1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
98. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 434, 463–64 (2005), vacated by
503 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7

106

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

The court rejected the government’s argument and refused to find that there
was an implicit waiver of the private parties’ right to bring takings claims contained in the use agreements. 99
Similarly, other circuit courts have held that, to be effective, a waiver
must purposefully release a right one knows that he or she possesses and that
it is highly unlikely that a valid release can be inferred absent any express manifestation. 100 An effective waiver requires actual and complete knowledge of
the nature of the right and also of the consequences of surrender. 101 Therefore,
a valid waiver cannot occur if the party does not understand that consenting to
government access will bar any claim for compensation if remedial measures
destroy the value of the property.
Furthermore, any ambiguity concerning a waiver of a constitutional right
is strictly construed in favor of preserving the right. 102 Contractual waivers are
assessed on a number of factors, including whether (1) unequal bargaining
power exists between the parties; (2) both parties appreciated the importance
and full impact of the waiver; and (3) the party waiving its right received consideration in return. 103 Courts will also examine the clarity and precision of
the contractual provision in determining whether the waiver was knowingly

99. Cienega Gardens, 503 F.3d at 1273.
100. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Constructive

consent to a waiver is not generally associated with the surrender of constitutional
rights.”); Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Burke Cty., 149 F.3d 277 (4th Cir.
1998). The Fourth Circuit qualified valid contractual waivers of constitutional rights
as follows:
The contractual waiver of a constitutional right must be a knowing waiver, must
be voluntarily given, and must not undermine the relevant public interest in order to be enforceable. Under these principles, courts have routinely enforced
voluntary agreements with the government in which citizens have, for example,
given up the right to sue through releases and covenants not to sue the government.

Id. at 280.
101. Hatfield, 306 F.3d at 229–30 (noting the holder of the right must possess “actual knowledge of the existence of the right or privilege, full understanding of its meaning, and clear comprehension of the consequence of the waiver”); see also Cullen v.
Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding the plaintiff did not waive the right to
present his claims to an Article III court unless he “possessed an awareness” that he
was waiving that right); Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d
Cir. 1988) (waiver of a constitutional right must be made “with full understanding of
the consequences” of the waiver).
102. Urban Developers LLC v. City of Jackson, 468 F.3d 281, 306 (5th Cir. 2006);
see also Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that principles governing waiver of constitutional rights apply equally in criminal and civil contexts).
103. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, at 187–88 (1972).
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made. 104 If a party to the document is not expressly made aware of the significance of a waiver provision in an agreement, the waiver is unlikely to be considered valid. 105
Combining these factors with the government’s burden to prove the propriety of seeking the waiver makes it highly unlikely that a typical EPA consent
to access form could be a valid and knowing waiver of a constitutional right. 106
Unfortunately, safeguards against forfeiture of a constitutional right only seem
to apply if the agreement is explicitly labeled a “waiver,” not if it merely functions as one. Therefore, while it may be very difficult for a landowner to waive
the right to bring a takings claim based on judicial safeguards, it is fairly easy
to accomplish the same result through consent. Most consent to access agreements have been interpreted as providing the government with an affirmative
defense rather than as waivers of the property owner’s right to sue. 107 Consequently, while a plaintiff may file suit notwithstanding having signed a consent
agreement, the government can use the agreement as a bar against recovery. 108
Even though an executed consent to access form will not constitute a knowing
relinquishment of the landowner’s right to sue the government, this agreement
can operate as the functional equivalent of a waiver.

III. COERCION OR CONTRACT: LOSING THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION
CLAIM
A. The Danger of Consent
What happens if the government’s remedial action has destroyed the use
and enjoyment of a contiguous property owner’s land? If the government has
“taken” a landowner’s private property for public use, the remedy is to seek

104. See, e.g., Weaver v. N.Y. City Emps.’ Retirement Sys., 717 F. Supp. 1039,
1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding a violation of plaintiff’s due process rights because a
notice of termination of benefits was “so confusing that a reasonable lay person would
not have known that he had an opportunity in fact to contest defendants’ finding”).
105. See, e.g., Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133, 139–40 (D. Me. 1976)
(finding a violation of property owners’ due process rights as (1) there was no waiver
because a signed mortgage did no more than state the government’s right to foreclose
on the property and (2) even if the language might be construed as a waiver, the government made no showing that the owners were actually made aware of the significance
of the fine print relied on as a waiver of constitutional rights).
106. Emmert Indus. Corp. v. City of Milwaukie, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178–79
(D. Or. July 7, 2006) (“[T]he government must demonstrate the propriety of seeking a
waiver of a constitutional right in light of both its legitimate interest in a waiver, if any,
and the benefit to be conferred upon the adverse party.”).
107. See, e.g., Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 291 (1995); Kirby Lake
Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 844 (Tex. 2010).
108. See, e.g., Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd., 320 S.W.3d at 844.
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just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 109 or the Tucker
Act. 110 The Takings Clause is “designed to bar [g]overnment from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.” 111 It is not necessary that the government take physical possession of the property for a taking to be found, only
that the owner lose most of his or her interest in, or enjoyment of, the property. 112 When the government acts in its eminent domain capacity, the implication is that it has appropriated the private property of an owner for some
ulterior purpose without the owner’s consent. 113
The same is true for inverse condemnation claims in which a landowner
seeks compensation for the government’s use of his or her private property
before any official condemnation proceedings have been instituted. 114 To
avoid potential takings liability, government agencies often try to postpone
condemnation by seeking the consent of the landowner to access the property. 115 The landowner’s consent (or lack thereof) to the government’s actions
is crucial to the success of the inverse condemnation suit. 116
Most disputes involving the interplay between landowner consent and inverse condemnation claims have been resolved in state courts. Several state
court opinions have held, pursuant to both federal and state takings clauses,
that lack of consent is a prerequisite for establishing a successful inverse condemnation or takings claim. 117 In City of Cibolo v. Koehler, landowners in

109. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (2018) (providing jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims for takings actions against the United States).
111. Penn Ctr. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
112. Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386, 1391 (Fed. Cl. Ct. 1970).
The specifics of what types of governmental actions constitute physical and regulatory
takings are beyond the scope of this Article. For a thorough breakdown of the current
status of typical EPA response actions and what amounts to a government taking, see
Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (1991).
113. Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 448, 533 (W.D.N.Y.
2002); see also Warner/Elektra/Atl. Corp. v. Cty. Of DuPage, 991 F.2d 1280, 1284 (7th
Cir. 1993) (“Laws authorizing condemnation entitle a governmental entity . . . to take
private property for its own use without the owner’s consent.” (emphasis added)).
114. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980).
115. See OSWER Directive, supra note 84, at 4.
116. See 8 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G14E.01 at n.6 (Matthew Bender, 3rd.
ed.) (“Implicit in an inverse condemnation claim is the notion that the government action at issue was without the landowner’s consent.”).
117. See, e.g., Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d
829, 844 (Tex. 2010) (“A person who consents to the governmental action cannot validly assert a takings claim.”); Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 254 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Neb.
1977) (“Eminent domain is defined generally as the power of the nation or a state, or
authorized public agency, to take or to authorize the taking of private property for a
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Texas brought a takings claim against the city for construction of a drainage
channel across their property. 118 The city claimed that a drainage easement
agreement signed by the landowners had “conclusively negate[d] the Koehlers’
takings claim as a matter of law because . . . the easement conclusively establishe[d] that the Koehlers consented to the easement . . . .” 119 The court allowed
the Koehlers to present their claim only because they had challenged the validity of the easement agreement itself and prevented the city from conclusively
establishing consent. 120 The court relied on article 1, § 17 of the Texas Constitution 121 in noting that “if the [d]rainage [e]asement were not void, [the
Koehlers] would likely be unable to establish absence of consent . . . .” 122
In Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, a federal district court followed
Supreme Court of California precedent in recognizing that consent is a defense
to an inverse condemnation suit but the scope of consent is dispositive of an
inverse condemnation suit. 123 The consent defense failed in Yamagiwa because the city was unable to prove that the plaintiff consented to the exact use
the city made of her property. 124 The court held that while consent functions
as a defense to an inverse condemnation claim in much the same way as a trespass or nuisance action, “the applicability of the defense turns on the consent.” 125 The court accordingly based its determination of whether a taking
had occurred on the scope of the consent given by the plaintiff – if the government had not acted outside of that scope, the plaintiff would have no right to
compensation. 126
public use without the owner’s consent . . . .”); Ponderosa Domestic Water Improvement Dist. v. Van Wyck, No. 1 CA–SA 15–0251, 2015 WL 6696816, at *2 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Oct. 29, 2015) (“Any waivers or consents the District has obtained may constitute
‘affirmative defenses’ to inverse condemnation claims by [land]owners relating to the
taking.”); VLX Props. v. S. States Utils., Inc., 792 So.2d 504, 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (finding no taking of pond water for storage when the owner consented to the
use); Rahm v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Co., 676 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
prior property owners had consented to the challenged land use and “any entitlement
for damages for trespass or inverse condemnation ceased”).
118. No. 04–11–00209–CV, 2011 WL 5869683, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 23,
2011).
119. Id. at *5.
120. Id. at *7.
121. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (“No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person . . . .”). Other state courts have relied on similar
language in takings clauses of their constitutions. See, e.g., Huard v. Town of Pelham,
986 A.2d 460, 466 (N.H. 2009) (“Under Part 1, Article 12 of the New Hampshire Constitution, ‘[n]o part of a man’s property shall be taken from him, or applied to public
uses, without his consent.’”).
122. Koehler, 2011 WL 5869683, at *5.
123. 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1104–05.
126. Id.
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In McElmurray v. Augusta-Richmond County, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia relied on both state 127 and federal 128 precedent to hold that property
owners who consent to government action cannot obtain an inverse condemnation remedy. 129 The federal precedent, Janowsky v. United States, held that,
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, a taking never occurs “when the property
owner agrees to allow his property to be used by the government.” 130 The
judgment in Janowsky was vacated in 1998 by the Federal Circuit because the
court found that there was evidence that the “consent” at issue had been coerced. 131 The court in McElmurray considered this case “reversed in part on
other grounds” and still relied on the original Janowsky analysis of consent
when addressing the takings claim at issue. 132
Other than the language in Janowsky, few federal cases have expressly
addressed the role of consent in an inverse condemnation claim. Two opinions
from the late 1990s, however, offer conflicting viewpoints on the issue. In
Scogin v. United States, a landowner operated a wood treatment facility on
fifty-three acres of land and 4,000 feet of navigable waterway in the Bayou
Bonfouca in Slidell, Louisiana. 133 After the Bayou Bonfouca site was listed
on the Superfund National Priorities List (“NPL”) in 1983, EPA asked for access to Scogin’s contiguous, uncontaminated land. 134 Eventually, the plaintiff
signed an agreement allowing EPA access to investigate and monitor groundwater readings for two months but would not extend the grant any further. 135
After a unilateral order compelled access to the property for a length of
time beyond the two months necessary to carry out the cleanup remedy, Scogin

127. 618 S.E.2d 59, 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). In Barwick v. Roberts, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that a plaintiff’s express consent to the use of his property defeated his claim under the Georgia constitution takings provision; “Private property
shall not be taken, or damaged, for public purposes, without just and adequate compensation being first paid.” 16 S.E.2d 867, 870 (Ga. 1941). Even though this provision
does not expressly state that consent is a part of analysis, the court concluded it was so.
Id.
128. McElmurray, 618 S.E.2d at 63.
129. Id. at 63–64.
130. 23 Cl. Ct. 706, 716–17 (1991), rev’d in part, vacated in part 133 F.3d 888
(Fed. Cir. 1998). Timothy Janowsky agreed to assist the FBI in an undercover investigation that involved the use of Janowsky’s vending company as a front for the operation. Id. at 707. When the government refused to buy the vending company after the
conclusion of the project, despite having allegedly promised Janowsky that it would,
Janowsky brought an inverse condemnation suit. Id. The court held that property owners who voluntarily deliver property to the government and later seek compensation
may have a remedy through contract principles but cannot maintain an inverse condemnation claim. Id. at 711–12.
131. Janowsky v. United States, 133 F.3d 888, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
132. McElmurray, 618 S.E.2d at 62 n.2.
133. 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 286 (1995).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 286–87.
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negotiated a lease with a contractor for EPA at the site. 136 Later, when Scogin
attempted to bring suit alleging a taking of his land, the court held that the lease
agreement “appear[ed] to constitute a consent to the governmental activity on
his property” and, consequently, meant that any damages recovered would be
reduced by the amount of compensation provided pursuant to the lease. 137 The
court, in dicta, stated that an owner’s grant of permission to another to access
his property means “the ‘right to exclude’ has been relinquished and not
taken.” 138 Scogin has been subsequently interpreted to mean that a landowner’s consent to government access and activity on property defeats a later
claim for compensation. 139
In 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York
reached the opposite conclusion. In Juliano v. Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie
Solid Waste Management Authority, Albert and Judene Juliano brought an inverse condemnation claim against a New York Public Authority (“MOSA”). 140
MOSA had been given the power to condemn real property within its area of
operation for the establishment of a solid waste facility. 141 The plaintiffs
signed an agreement with MOSA in which they were compensated $1,000 for
a grant of access for entry and testing of their premises. 142 MOSA subsequently installed monitoring wells on the property and designated it as a potential site for a proposed sanitary landfill. 143 The plaintiffs eventually brought
suit for both a regulatory taking of their property through MOSA’s designation
and a physical taking through the installation of the monitoring wells. 144 The
court dismissed the regulatory taking claim as unripe 145 but held that the plaintiffs’ land had been taken through the installation of the monitoring wells. 146
MOSA argued that the signed testing agreement evidenced valid consent,
which limited any subsequent damage claims. 147 The court noted that, although the plaintiffs’ decision to enter into the testing agreement appeared facially voluntary, the fact that New York eminent domain law “deprived
[p]laintiffs of the power to refuse” access negated even the possibility of consent. 148 The plaintiffs’ argument was that they had been coerced into signing

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 288.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 292.
See Schwenke, supra note 90, at 791; see also Textainer Equip. Mgmt. v.
United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211, 218 (2011).
140. 983 F. Supp. 319, 321–22 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 322.
143. Id. at 323.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 324.
146. Id. at 328.
147. Id. at 329.
148. Id.
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the testing agreement because they would have been compelled to comply with
the request regardless. 149 The court agreed:
A material distinction exists between a consent form freely entered into
and an agreement entered into that contemplates activities on
[p]laintiffs’ property which, but for MOSA’s statutory authority to
force entry, [p]laintiffs would not have allowed . . . . In the present
case[,] New York [e]minent [d]omain [l]aw section 404 authorized a
mandatory physical occupation of [p]laintiffs’ property. Accordingly,
sufficient evidence exists to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether [g]overnment compulsion was present, thus obviating
[p]laintiffs’ consent. 150

Several scholars have advocated for this distinction between consent
granted based on knowledge of the government’s ultimate right to compel cooperation and other forms of consent “freely entered into.” 151 Unfortunately,
however, while Juliano clearly calls into question the validity of such consent,
most courts have adopted the rationale in Scogin – holding that even the most
technical and nominal indication of consent defeats an otherwise meritorious
inverse condemnation claim. 152 The distinction in Juliano has been largely
rejected in lieu of holding that a grant of access agreement is a valid contract
and not coercive merely because the United States is a party. 153

B. How Sovereign Did It Seem?
Beyond the scope of explicit inverse condemnation claims, federal courts
have considered whether parties can voluntarily consent to similar agreements
with the government. A line of federal case law indicates that the government
is generally not liable for a taking when it acts in a proprietary capacity as a

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 322 n.1.
Id. at 329.
See, e.g., Schwenke, supra note 90, at 750 n.4.
See, e.g., BMR Gold Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 277, 283 (1998); Textainer Equip. Mgmt. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211, 218 (2011).
153. Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 359–60 (2006).
Even were judicial takings cognizable, it is hard to fathom how a consent decree
could meet the requirements for a taking, among which is the presence of a
compelled acquiescence. Such decrees are hybrids – part order, part contract –
and obviously reflect the agreement of the parties, often to provisions that
would be beyond the power of the court to impose without the parties’ consent.

Id.; see also Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986); Johnson v.
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 648, 654 (2001), aff’d, 317 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003); SEC
v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 290 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2002).
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mere party in a contractual relationship. 154 The dispositive determination is
the extent to which the government acts in its “sovereign” capacity. 155
In Textainer Equipment Management v. United States, the government
leased storage containers from the plaintiffs through a third party but failed to
return all of the rented materials by the end of the lease. 156 The lease, however,
provided a buyout option at a reduced governmental rate for any containers that
were not returned to the plaintiffs. 157 When the buyout condition was activated, the plaintiffs brought a takings claim against the United States for the
unreturned containers. 158 Relying on the dicta in Scogin, 159 the court held that
“[w]here a property owner grants the government permission to use or occupy
the plaintiffs’ property by agreement, the government’s use or occupation of
that property does not give rise to a taking.” 160 The court concluded that to
prove a taking, the plaintiffs had to show that the government had appropriated
some property other than that which had been addressed in the lease. 161
When analyzing the sovereign acts doctrine, it is important to distinguish
between the government’s role as a party to a consensual agreement acting in

154. See Textainer, 99 Fed. Cl. at 218 (“The government has not taken property
where it acts in its proprietary capacity pursuant to a contract right; to effect a taking,
the government must act pursuant to its sovereign powers or invoke sovereign protections.”); see also Janicki Logging Co., Inc., v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 338, 346
(1996) (holding that there was no taking when the Forest Service “acted in a proprietary
capacity as a party to a contract and purported to exercise its rights for which it bargained”).
155. Textainer, 99 Fed. Cl. at 218.
156. Id. at 212.
157. Id. at 212–13.
158. Id.
159. 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 291 (1995) (“[A] property owner relinquishes the right to
exclude when the owner consents to the entry, use, and occupation of subject property.”).
160. Id. at 218; see also J.J. Henry Co. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1246, 1249 (Ct.
Cl. 1969).
The clear thrust of the authorities is that where the government possesses property under the color of legal right, as by an express contract, there is seldom a
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The amendment has limited application to the relative rights in property of parties . . . voluntarily created by
contract.

Id.

161. Textainer, 99 Fed. Cl. at 218–19; see also BMR Gold Corp. v. United States,
41 Fed. Cl. 277, 282–83 (1998) (dismissing a plaintiff’s takings claim when he had
consented to the Marine Corp’s access to his property because “[a]lthough the right to
exclude others from one’s property is a compensable Fifth Amendment interest, a property owner relinquishes the right to exclude when the owner consents to the entry, use,
and occupation of the subject property.”).
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its proprietary capacity and as a regulator acting in its sovereign capacity. 162
Generally, only sovereign acts are subject to the Takings Clause. 163 Although
rights arising out of a contract with the government are “protected by the Fifth
Amendment,” 164 if rights are voluntarily created by contract, a takings theory
has a limited application. If the government interferes with contractual rights,
the appropriate claim is generally one for breach of contract, not a takings
claim. 165 Most case law concerning the intersection of contract and takings
claims addresses the contractual claims first and holds that if a claimant is successful on a breach of contract claim, he or she cannot then recover on a takings
theory. 166 It thus follows that if the government does not perform some action
beyond the scope of consent granted in a consent-to-access form, a plaintiff
cannot recover for breach of contract. At the same time, the plaintiff may not
be able to recover through inverse condemnation or takings claims. 167
In Stockton East Water District v. United States, the plaintiff brought a
claim against the government for breach of the contractual terms related to certain water restrictions. 168 After determining that the government had not
breached the contract, 169 the court held that the government had acted primarily
in its commercial (or proprietary) capacity and not as a sovereign regulator;
therefore, the plaintiffs could not assert a takings claim. 170 The same has been
held in cases where the issue of the government’s breach was not addressed
prior to a dismissal of the takings claim. 171 A minority approach restricts this
162. David W. Spohr, (When) Does a Contract Claim Trump a Takings Claim?
Lessons from the Water Wars, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 125, 136 (2012).
163. Nwogu v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 637, 661 (2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part 497 Fed. App’x 952 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Envtl. Safety Consultants, Inc. v.
United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 77, 100 (2010).
164. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
165. St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
see also Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 969 F.2d 1028, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
166. See Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Castle v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Hughes
Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001). No
language from these opinions indicates that this prioritization is an application of the
constitutional avoidance doctrine.
167. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc., 271 F.3d at 1070 (holding that when parties
validly contract with the government “remedies arise from the contracts themselves,
rather than from the constitutional protection of private property rights”).
168. 75 Fed. Cl. 321, 324 (2007), modified in part, 76 Fed. Cl. 497 (2007), aff’d in
part, vacated in part 583 F.3d 1344.
169. Id. at 363–64 (2007).
170. Id. at 373–74.
171. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 532, 535
(2005) (holding that the “availability of contract remedies is sufficient to vitiate a takings claim, even if it ultimately is determined that no breach occurred” and that the
takings claim was “entirely subsumed within the contract claim,” even where the government successfully asserted a defense).
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“either/or” constraint of claims to situations where a plaintiff first recovers in
contract, 172 but most courts focus on the availability of a claim and not the
result. 173
As long as the relationship between the individual and the government is
purely a matter of contract and the government is not believed to be acting in
its sovereign capacity, the government acts solely in its proprietary capacity. 174
Recourse for any disagreement will then be limited to pursuing a breach of
contract action, not a suit based on a taking. 175

C. Finding Fifth Amendment Coercion
The question becomes, in what circumstances has a party validly contracted with the government such that a takings claim is negated? When is the
consent in question truly free of coercion from the overbearing threat of
CERCLA liability and enforcement? Where coercion exists there cannot be
consent. 176 To prove coercion, a party must show (1) that some wrongful act
or threat from the other party to the transaction and (2) that the party was overcome by fear and “precluded from using free will.” 177 Courts look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent was truly a product of
the individual’s free choice and not a submission to some overbearing force of
authority. 178
For consent to be valid in a Fourth Amendment analysis, the government
must usually show that the consent was not only “unequivocal” and “knowingly given” but also given without coercion, “implied or express.” 179 There

172. See, e.g., Henry Hous. Ltd. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 250, 256 (2010); Consumers Energy Co. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 152, 158 (2008); System Fuels, Inc. v.
United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 163, 172–73 (2005); see also Detroit Edison Co. v. United
States, 56 Fed. Cl. 299, 300–02 (2003) (holding that a plaintiff must actually win a
breach of contract claim to warrant dismissing a takings claim).
173. Spohr, supra note 162, at 146.
174. Janicki Logging Co., Inc., v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 338, 346 (1996).
175. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). “Taking claims rarely arise under government contracts because the
[g]overnment acts in its commercial or proprietary capacity in entering contracts, rather
than in its sovereign capacity.” Id.
176. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). See generally Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921) (holding that misrepresentation, overt coercion, intimidation, fraud, trickery, and deceit vitiate consent).
177. Hsue Tung v. Peters, No. AW–09–576, 2009 WL 5206627, at *3 (D. Md. Dec.
23, 2009).
178. United States v. Garcia, 56 F.3d 418, 422 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[T]he question whether a consent . . . was
in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express of implied, is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.”).
179. United States v. Jeter, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1347 (D. Utah 2005).
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are many clear acts of coercion, such as threats of detention or arrest. 180 However, in a Fifth Amendment context, the distinction between persuasion and
coercion – which determines the presence or absence of a taking – is “highly
fact-specific and hardly simple to determine.” 181
Economic coercion has been held to exist only where the landowner had
“no alternative but to submit to it” – even when the government threatens to
impose large fines for (allegedly) unreasonable denial of access or the economic liability of CERCLA responsibility for the spread of hazardous waste. 182
Even though the threatening of a judicial penalty for withholding consent has
been deemed coercive, the mere presence of a signed consent form is considered to suggest voluntariness to the agreement. 183 For example, in United
States v. Ownbey Enterprises, Inc., Ownbey, a small oil company in Georgia,
challenged a previously entered into consent order with EPA on the grounds
that the owner had signed the agreement under duress and coercion. 184 Ownbey claimed that the threat of “exorbitant fines” prevented him from exercising
his constitutional right to challenge the validity of the consent order. 185 The
court ruled that the possible imposition of fines could not be considered a form
of coercion because the amount and imposition of the fines were at the discretion of the court rather than EPA. 186 Furthermore, the fact that defendant did
not understand the scope of EPA’s legal authority to issue unilateral orders did
not constitute duress because EPA made no illegal threat of action – a required
finding for the presence of duress. 187
The court ultimately held that a defendant is not coerced into a contract
merely because the defendant was reluctant to agree to the terms, the terms
were unfavorable for him, or the negotiating process was unfair because of the
parties’ unequal bargaining power. 188 Instead, the court held that Ownbey had
the viable option of not agreeing to the consent order and forcing EPA to issue
a unilateral order that could have been contested in a judicial proceeding. 189

180. Cuviello v. City of Stockton, No. CIV. S–007–1625 LLK/KJM, 2009 WL
9156144, *17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009).
181. A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
182. Lee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 34 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1994).
183. Eidson v. Owens, 515 F.3d 1139, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2008).
184. 789 F. Supp. 1145, 1149, 1151 (N.D. Ga. 1992). The court’s opinion names
the company as the defendant, although it addresses the owner’s interactions with EPA
in what is presumably an agency capacity. See id. at 1147–48. For purposes of its
holding, the court made no mention of the degree to which a company’s rights are coextensive with that of the owner. See generally id.
185. Id. at 1149.
186. Id. at 1152.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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The fact that the defendant had two very clear alternatives showed that he was
not forced to sign the consent order. 190
In Janowsky v. United States, the Federal Circuit suggested that there may
be more to the distinction recognized in Juliano between agreements freely
entered into and the “coerced consent” in contracts negotiated with the government, which have the power to compel its ultimate desired result. 191 The Janowskys entered into a contract with the government to assist in an FBI investigation, which would involve use of the Janowskys’ vending machine business. 192 The parties exchanged a number of agreements that reflected the fact
it would be necessary for Mr. Janowsky to sell his business after the conclusion
of the operation. 193 It was agreed that if the business appraised for less than
$300,000, the FBI would pay Janowsky the difference between the appraisal
and that amount. 194 Before any agreement was officially signed, but after Janowsky was inadvertently exposed as a FBI informant, his continued cooperation in the investigation was secured through the FBI’s threat that it would
withdraw protection of Janowsky and his family if he pulled out of the operation. 195
The Janowskys sued the FBI, alleging that the government took their
vending machine business without just compensation. 196 The trial court found
that the Janowskys acted voluntarily and that no takings claim could exist in
such circumstances. 197 However, on appeal, the court held the Janowskys were
coerced because their protection was conditioned upon Mr. Janowsky’s continued participation in the operation. 198 The court further held that, although
the Janowskys did not necessarily have a right to FBI protection, the FBI “coercively interfered with the Janowskys’ property right” in their vending business by threatening to withhold protection. 199

IV. A NOTE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
The conclusion of the Janowsky opinion offered one further insight into
the takings analysis issue on appeal. In addressing the validity of Mr. Janowsky’s consent, the court recognized that his agreement to work with the FBI
in the sting operation had been conditioned on the government’s protection of
190. Id.; see also United States v. Hajduk, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1227 (D. Colo.
2005) (finding defendants’ consent lawful even when the government stated prior to
the consent agreement that a sampling box was to be installed on defendants’ property
regardless of consent, and defendants did not have an option to refuse).
191. See generally 133 F.3d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
192. Id. at 889.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 890.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 892.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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his family. 200 The court then noted that this situation likely implicated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 201 Although no person is entitled to receipt
of a government benefit, there are restraints on the government’s ability to deny
citizens receipt of federal benefits. 202 For instance, the government may not
withhold a benefit from a citizen for any reason that infringes on his or her
constitutionally protected interests. 203 A person therefore cannot be required
to surrender a Fifth Amendment right to receive just compensation for a governmental taking in exchange for a discretionary benefit if the benefit is unrelated to the property. 204
Regarding benefits that are related to the property, the government may
encourage and obtain participation in federal regulatory programs by offering
“attractive incentive[s]” or “threatening to withdraw” federal benefits based on
participation. 205 Compliance with a condition attached to a federal benefit will
not usually be considered federal coercion. 206 Where states or individuals are
free to accept or reject the offered benefit, Congress may attach lawful conditions to the benefits. 207 However, when there is a communication of a required
condition for receipt of a benefit, courts often examine language of the communication at issue to determine if it is coercive. 208 While documents that use
“should” or “may” clearly communicate that “there has been no order compelling the [party] to do anything,” 209 the use of compelling language (such as
“must”) in government communications suggests coercion. 210

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
Id. (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 597).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
Adolph v. FEMA, 854 F.2d 732, 736 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937)).
See B&G Enters. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 523, 527 (1999) (finding that
FEMA could not be charged with an unconstitutional taking because no “unconstitutional conditions [were] attached to the benefits” of the NFIP program and “coercion
by the [g]overnment” was not present).
208. See, e.g., Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am. v. FDIC¸ 132 F. Supp 3d 98, 121
(D.D.C. 2015).
209. Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir.
2012); see also In re Diamantis, No. 13-11201, 2014 WL 1203182, at *6 (U.S. Bankr.
N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2014) (finding no coercion or duress where a debtor signed an
agreement in order to retain disability benefits after communications with employer
were found to be “necessary to explain the debtor’s options and to solicit his agreement”).
210. See Schwenke, supra note 90, at 750 n.4 (stating there is “very little real voluntary consent” present in these agreements).
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CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the scope of CERCLA has been expanding in response
to the needs and concerns of the nation, but it has been simultaneously plagued
by its coercive reputation. The far-reaching scope of its liability scheme has
been tempered by a variety of conditional defenses for cooperative landowners.
The current state of the contiguous property owner defense adopted in the
Small Business Liability Protection Act presents adjacent landowners who are
victims of migrating hazardous substances with an unconscionable option. The
only way to avoid the imposition of CERCLA liability caused by a third party,
including potentially the government itself, 211 is to grant free and unrestricted
access to EPA and other response agents for the duration of the approved remedial measures.
However, most landowners do not understand the significance of the onepage, non-negotiable consent-to-access forms they are offered by EPA. Signing one of these forms likely destroys the ability to ever bring a successful
takings or inverse condemnation claim, regardless of the nature or duration of
the government’s occupation of the property. While such a forfeiture of a constitutional right should invoke “full knowledge” requirements and other presumptions against the finding of a valid surrender, these safeguards will likely
not apply because the agreement is not technically a waiver.
The landowner is, therefore, pigeonholed into asserting the defense of coercion to challenge the validity of the agreement. However, this defense is not
likely to succeed given the voluntary wording contained within the government’s grant of access forms and court precedent viewing such agreements as
contracts where the government merely acts as one party to a transaction. Unless the landowner is able to prove that the government acted outside of its
proprietary capacity, even an objectively unfair agreement will be enforced
against the property owner.
The result of this setup is that a contiguous property owner is functionally
compelled to grant the government unrestricted access to the owner’s land,
thereby effectively relinquishing the right to seek just compensation while simultaneously facing the imposition of liability for hazardous waste, which the
landowner possibly had no knowledge of or part in disposing. CERCLA’s
contiguous property owner defense is conditioned on what is, at best, extremely
questionable consent in its voluntariness and scope. However subtle, this coercion still haunts the statute and the innocent landowners affected by it.
The simplest correction to avoid setting this trap for innocent landowners
is to remove the grant of full and unrestricted access to contaminated properties
from CERCLA’s list of requirements for the contiguous property owner defense. EPA would still be free to negotiate with landholders for grants of access but would do so without threatening to impose liability for hazardous
waste if the access is not given without compensation. While many landowners
211. See generally Waverley View Inv’rs, LLC v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 750

(2018).
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will likely be willing to grant EPA access to clean up contaminated property
even without a promise of compensation, eliminating the statute’s coercive
land access requirements would give the defense its proper effect of protecting
innocent property holders without demanding they surrender their ownership
rights.
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